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An investigation of interregional trade network
structures
Roberto Basile, Pasquale Commendatore, Luca De Benedictis and Ingrid Kubin
Abstract We provide empirical evidence on the network structure of trade flows
between European regions and discuss the theoretical underpinning of such a struc-
ture. First, we analyze EU regional trade data using Social Network Analysis. We
describe the topology of this network and compute local and global centrality mea-
sures. Finally, we consider the distribution of higher order statistics, through the
analysis of local clustering and main triadic structures in the triad census of interre-
gional trade flows. In the theoretical part, we explore the relationship between trade
costs and trade links. As shown by Behrens (2004, 2005a, 2005b) in a two-region
linear new economic geography (NEG) model, trade costs and the local market size
determine, even with finite trade costs, unconditional autarky and unilateral trade,
that is, a one-directional flow from one region to the other. Following these contri-
butions and guided by the empirical evidence, we clarify the relationship between
market competition, trade costs and the patterns of trade in a three-region NEG
model. We identify a larger set of trade network configurations other the three ele-
mentary ones that occur at the dyadic level between two regions (no trade, one-way
trade, reciprocated two-way trade), and relate the model with the triad census.
1 Introduction
In this paper we provide some empirical evidence on the network structure of trade
flows at the regional level in Europe and we discuss the possible theoretical under-
pinning of such a structure. In the empirical part of the paper, we look at the EU
regional trade data recently produced by the PBL Netherlands Environmental As-
sessment Agency (Thissen, Diodato, and Van Oort, 2013; Thissen, Van Oort, and
Diodato, 2013; Thissen, Lankhuizen, and Jonkeren, 2015), and we analyze it using
Social Network Analysis tools (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). We take advantage of
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both the binary structure of the European regional trade network (analyzing the pres-
ence and absence of regional trade flows) and of its weighted counterpart (making
use of the distribution of the value of trade flows, measured in millions of Euros).
We use the latter to construct a meaningful threshold to restrict the density of the
binary structure, and, following De Benedictis and Tajoli (2011) and De Benedic-
tis, Nenci, Santoni, Tajoli, and Vicarelli (2014), we visualize the trade network at
different levels of the threshold, define and describe the topology of the network
and produce some of the main local and global centrality measures for the different
European regions. Finally,
. . . since the most interesting and basic questions of social structure arise with regard to
triads (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005),
we account for the distribution of higher order statistics of the network, through
the analysis of local clustering and the main triadic structures in the triad census of
interregional trade flows.
Given the explicit assumption that trade costs, together with regional markets
size, are as for the gravity model of international trade (De Benedictis and Tajoli,
2011; Anderson, 2011; Head and Mayer, 2014) among the main determinants of
inter-regional trade flows, the network analysis of regional trade flows in Europe
informs the main topological properties of the data that must be reflected in the
modeling of such trade flows.
From the theoretical point of view we explore how changes in crucial parameters
- especially a reduction in trade costs – may favor the creation of trade links. The
theoretical framework we adopt is a three-region linear new economic geography
(NEG) model. We have chosen the linear version of a NEG model to overcome a
crucial weakness of the standard approach as developed in the literature beginning
from Krugman (1991). Indeed, in the standard NEG model all regions trade with
each other as long as trade costs are finite. This follows from the isoelastic demand
function – because of the specific assumption on consumer’s CES preferences –
and the ad valorem, proportional to price, iceberg trade costs. In the linear version
of the NEG model, as developed by Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002), this is
not necessarily true. As shown by Behrens (2004, 2011, 2005a) for a two-region
linear NEG model, trade costs and the dimension of the local market may determine
unconditional autarky even in the presence of finite trade costs and asymmetric
patterns of trade, that is a one-directional flow from one region to the other. Of
crucial importance is the size and density of the industrial sector, that even in the
presence of symmetric bilateral trade costs, may induce differences in local prices –
with a lower price in the larger market. As stated by Behrens:
price competition and trade costs endogenously create interregional asymmetries in market
access and give rise to one-way trade in differentiated products (Behrens, 2005a, p. 473).
The same result is obtained by Okubo, Picard, and Thisse (2014, OPT). These au-
thors remark that while the NEG and trade literature stress
the importance of trade barriers for the intensity of competition and the spatial pattern of
the global economy,
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it pays much less attention to the reverse relationship:
the impact of competition on the nature and intensity of trade as well as on the location of
economic activities.
OPT capture the intensity of competition in domestic markets within a linear NEG
model by assuming two regions with asymmetric population sizes.
Following the above mentioned contributions, our theoretical analysis aims to
clarify the relationship between the intensity of competition, trade costs and the pat-
terns of trade. Differently from the previous literature, and guided by the empirical
evidence, we will consider a three-region model.1 This allows us to identify a larger
set of trade network configurations other the three elementary ones that occur at
the dyadic level between two regions (no trade, one-way trade from one region to
the other, reciprocated two-way trade), and relate the model with characteristics of
the triad census. We also elaborate on how the structure of a trade network can be
modified as trade costs vary. In order to focus on the properties of the short-run
equilibrium and on the emergence of network structures in this time framework, we
exclude factor migration.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents some stylized facts on the
dominant interregional trade patters in Europe. Section 3 presents the basic eco-
nomic framework of the theoretical model, i.e. a three-region NEG linear model
with asymmetric trade costs and all possible configurations of trade flows between
two regions. In Section 3 we derive the short-run equilibrium and determine the
trade costs thresholds that determine all network configurations. Section 4 reports a
brief discussion and concludes.
2 Interregional trade network in Europe: some stylized facts
In this section we perform an empirical analysis of the interregional trade network
in Europe in 2010 using a new dataset on constructed trade flows between the Euro-
pean NUTS-2 regions. The aim is to provide some stylized facts about interregional
trade patterns in Europe. In particular, through a triad census analysis, we want to
identify the dominant triadic types, that is the frequency of each possible triadic
structure, in the directed binary European regional trade network.
Interregional trade data are noticeably missing from European regional databases.
The only database on interregional trade in goods and services at the NUTS-2 ter-
ritorial aggregation level, fully consistent with international trade data between the
1 In the NEG literature, Ago, Isono, and Tabuchi (2006) and Behrens (2011) put also forward
three-region linear models a` la Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002). However, they limit their
analysis to specific trade cost structures; moreover they do not allow for unilateral trade flows. Ex-
ceptions are Behrens (2011) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). The first one studies two numerical
examples that, for a specific trade costs structure, may determine one-way trade flows; the latter
consider, in the context of a model with heterogeneous firms, the case of identical trade costs for
the three regions.
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Member States and with the rest of the world, is produced by the PBL Nether-
lands Environmental Assessment Agency (Thissen, Diodato, and Van Oort, 2013;
Thissen, Van Oort, and Diodato, 2013; Thissen, Lankhuizen, and Jonkeren, 2015).
These data are estimated by essentially breaking down international trade flows and
national Supply and Use Tables to the regional level (see Thissen, Lankhuizen, and
Jonkeren, 2015, for an overview of the methodology used in the construction of the
data). Importantly, the methodology used is a parameter-free approach and therefore
deviates from earlier methods based on the gravity model that suffer from analytical
inconsistencies. Unlike a gravity model estimation, the methodology stays as close
as possible to observed data without imposing any geographical trade patterns. The
resulting data can therefore be used as such in our trade network analysis.
Nevertheless, as pointed out by Thissen, Diodato, and Van Oort (2013), one has
to keep in mind that the constructed interregional trade data are inferred from other
data sources and are not measured as a flow from one region to another. Given the
compatibility constraints with macro variables, some bias in the trade flows between
regions inside a country or between regions of different countries, might result from
the weighting procedure used in the construction of the data. In particular the num-
ber of positive trade flows is extraordinary high with respect to other international
trade data at the national level, such as the Comtrade UN database. The number of
zeros in the regional trade matrix is minimal, meaning that the resulting trade net-
work is almost a fully connected one. Therefore, we opted to use the information
contained in the data to distinguish the main regional trade flows from the flows
being lower than a chosen threshold w. Then, we exploit only the resulting binary
structure of the truncated regional trade matrix, focusing on the relative dimension
of trade links rather than on the individual absolute value of trade flows between
pair of regions.
The version of the bi-regional trade database used in our empirical work com-
prises 267×267= 71,289 observations of intra- or interregional trade flows among
European regions for the year 2010 (Thissen, Lankhuizen, and Jonkeren, 2015). Ex-
port and import flows (both priced free on board) are measured in values (million of
euros) and divided into 6 product categories (aggregates AB, CDE, F, GHI, JK and
LMNOP of the NACE rev. 1.1). For our purposes, we only use the aggregate CDE,
which includes “Mining and quarrying” (Section C), “Manufacturing” (Section D)
and “Electricity, gas and water supply” (Section E). The countries covered by the
data are the countries of the EU-27 (Croatia is not included).
We explore this new dataset through network analysis. As in De Benedictis,
Nenci, Santoni, Tajoli, and Vicarelli (2014), we visualize the trade network, define
and describe the topology of the binary network and produce some of the main net-
work’s statistics (i.e. local and global centrality measures). We also calculate higher
order statistics, enriching the analysis with the reports on local clustering and the
triad census of inter-regional trade links.
In general terms, the fundamental unit of analysis necessary to study regional
trade flows is at the dyadic level rs: if between region r - the exporting region –
and region s - the importing region – trade takes place, two levels of information
are recorded. The first one is about the existence of a trade link, and it is a binary
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measure that takes the value one if a trade link exists and zero otherwise. The second
is about the intensity of the trade relation between the two regions r and s, and is
a continuous measure that is conditional on the associated binary measure: if the
binary measure is zero, the only possible value that the intensity of the relation
can take is zero; if the binary variable is one, the intensity of the relation takes
real positive values. Since trade flows are directional, it is not in general correct to
impose any kind of symmetry, and the value of trade flows between r and s will not
be equivalent to the value of trade flows between s and r.
Even if the fundamental unit of analysis is at the dyadic level rs, the decision of
agents from region r to trade with agents of region s is not taken in isolation, but it
must consider the (best) possible option of trading with region z as an alternative.
This is true for both r and s: dyadic trade flows do not occur in isolation. This moti-
vates the use of network analysis in studying the relation between r and s, extending
to the n-th level the logic behind the study of the so-called third-region (z) effect.
More formally, a trade network N = (V,L,P,W ) consists of a graph G = (V,L),
with V = 1,2, ...,n being a set of nodes (the regions, labeled with the respective
NUTS-2 code) and L a set of links between pairs of vertices (e.g., trade partnership),
plus P, the additional information on the vertices, and W the additional information
on the links of the graph. The additional information included in the line value
functionW captures the intensity of trade between r and s (in million of euros). The
information on the vertices (P) assembles different properties or characteristics of
the regions (regions’ labels, GDP, population, and so on). As mentioned, the trade
graph is a directed graph in nature, since lrs ∈ {0,1} indicates the existence or not
of some exports from region r to region s, and lrs 6= lsr.
The graph associated to the EU regional trade network, G=(V,L), has an average
dimension of 267 vertices (V = 1, ...,267) and 70,898 trade links (L= 1, ...,70,898)
out of 71,022 possible links (i.e. there are only 124 zeros, 0.27 %). Indeed, as the
data is constructed, the EU regional trade network is strongly connected, that is al-
most every vertex r is reachable from every s by a direct walk. However, for many
dyadic observations the amount of exports is negligible. Thus, in order to visualize
the network and to compute local and global centrality measures we use the infor-
mation associated with the intensity of the links to define an appropriate threshold
for the selection of links, and then exploit the binary information of the resulting
network.
As an example, excluding all dyadic observations lower than 25 million of euros,
the remaining flows almost cover the 90% of the total intra-Europe inter-regional
trade in the aggregate sector CDE (i.e. imports+exports, which amount to almost
3,000 billions of Euros) (see Table 2). Adopting a threshold of w > 25 the number
of edges (and so the density) is substantially reduced, from 70,898 to 20,086 (from
0.998 to 0.285), and one region (PT15) appears as an isolate. The density of the
truncated network indicates that the inter-regional trade network is not regular and is
far from being complete, or in other terms if the heterogeneity in the strength of links
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is used to select their presence, this heterogeneity is reflected in the connectivity of
the network.2
The choice of the threshold of w > 25, simply based on the criterion to cover
the 90% of the total intra-Europe inter-regional trade, may certainly appear arbi-
trary. A valid assessment of the robustness of our analysis to alternative choices of
the threshold therefore requires a preliminary exploration of the distribution of in-
terregional export values to ascertain whether any discontinuity takes place in the
neighborhood of 25. To perform this check, we report in figure 1 the estimated ker-
nel density of interregional export values. The visual inspection of the graph shows
a reasonably smooth distribution and does not reveal any relevant jump at the cut
off of 25. This evidence supports our choice. As a “litmus test”, the results of the
network analysis turned out to be robust to any alternative choice of the threshold
just around 25 (for example 20 or 30 millions). With these results in hand, we can
safely proceed by considering the interregional trade network resulting from the ap-
plication of the threshold of w > 25 as our benchmark. Moreover, we assess the
sensitivity of our analysis to alternative thresholds much further from 25 (namely
for w > 500, w > 1000 and w > 2500, accounting for about 25%, 10% and 1% of
the total intra-Europe trade) (see table 2).
Full w>25 mln. w>500 mln. w>1000 mln. w>2500 mln.
% of intra-European trade 100.0 91.0 24.4 10.0 1.3
Number of nodes (regions) 267 266 217 100 13
Number of links 70,898 20,086 834 200 12
% of zeros 0.27 71.72 98.82 99.71 99.98
Density 0.998 0.283 0.018 0.003 0.001
Degree centralization 0.002 0.717 0.988 0.997 0.999
Degree SD 0.006 0.181 0.026 0.030 0.115
Eigenvector centralization 0.001 0.572 0.894 0.894 0.583
Eigenvector SD 0.006 0.297 0.162 0.204 0.322
Clustering 0.999 0.690 0.227 0.138 0.000
Table 1 Trade network properties for different thresholds. The density of a graph is the frequency
of realized edges relative to potential edges. The clustering coefficient measures the proportion of
vertex triples that form triangles (transitivity).
With a threshold of w> 500 or higher, the percentage of inter-regional European
trade covered by data used to define the trade network gets substantially reduced,
and with a threshold of w > 1000 the majority of European regions are excluded
from the analysis and appear as isolates (see also Figure 2), so that the number of
zeros become exorbitant. This can be easily visualized using a sociogram for the
different levels of threshold.
In Figure 2, each European region is represented by a node in the topological
space. The application of a so called force-directed algorithm on the regional trade
data with valued links makes regions which are strongly connected close to each
others, while regions which are not connected tend to be located far apart (Freeman,
1979). However, the position of each region does not depend only on its bilateral
2 The sub-network including links with w > 25 is still weakly connected, but not strongly con-
nected, that is not every vertex r is reachable from every s by a directed walk.
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Fig. 1 Density of interregional trade flows
links but also on the indirect effect of others: the trade partners of its trade partners
will contribute to determine the region’s position in the network. The role of the
third-region effect clearly emerges from the visualizations in Figure 2.
Figure 2 represents the directed network of European trade partners at the re-
gional level in 2010. Nodes are European regions identified by NUTS-2 codes,
(P=AT11, . . . , UKN0), while links are weighted by the strength of trade flows (val-
ues in million of euros) (W = {FR71,UKD3 = 251.69} , . . . ,{ITC4,ITG1 = 5349.30}).
Panels (a), (b), (c) and (d) visualize all trade links with weightw≥ 25;500;1000;2500,
respectively.
As shown in panel (d) the main European trade flows are between Italian regions
(ITG1, ITC4, ITE4) and Spain (ES51), on one side, and German landers (DE11,
DE12, DE21, DEA1) and France (FR10), on the other. Considering links of lesser
strength (panel(c)) reinforces the impression that intra-national trade constitutes a
substantial part of the structure of the European regional trade. New communities
emerge (e.g. the Nordic countries, Poland, Greece) and the previous ones get rein-
forced by the inclusion of new links: the Italy-Spain community now includes some
Portuguese, Austrian, Hungarian and Slovakian regions; and the Germany-France
community is now enlarged to regions in Belgium, UK and the Netherlands. Colors
indicate homogeneous cluster/community/modules of regions defined according to
modularity (Newman, 2006).3
Regions like ITC4, DE12, DE21 are at the center of the network, while regions
like FI20, PL43, EE00, at the extreme left of the visualizations in figure 2, or PT30,
BG32, PT15, at the extreme right, are at the boundaries of the network structure.
3 Networks with high modularity have dense connections between the nodes within modules but
sparse connections between nodes in different modules. We use modularity to detect the commu-
nity structure of the EU regional trade network. See Newman (2006) on this issue.
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Fig. 2 Regional Trade in Europe: 2010. The figure represents the network of European trade part-
ners at the regional level in 2010. Panel (a) visualizes all trade links with weight (exports) w≥ 25
(million of euros); panel (b) visualizes trade links with w ≥ 500; panel (c) visualizes trade links
with w≥ 1000; and panel (d) visualizes trade links with w≥ 2500. Regions (nodes) are identified
by their NUTS-2 codes. Colors indicate homogeneous clusters defined according to modularity
(with 12 clusters).
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The EU regional trade network displays a core-periphery structure, with the more
active regions (i.e. with higher w) at the core. Also other regions are at the center
of the visualizations in figure 2: UKE3, CZ01, NL12 are visually central, but their
level of w is not among the highest percentiles of the distribution of w’s. Their posi-
tion depends on their respective links with their major trade partners. With respect
to peripheral regions they are in fact preferentially linked with central regions. As
pointed out above, indeed, centrality depends on direct links but can also depend on
the centrality of regional trade partners. To clarify these issues, we will report the
evidence of different centrality measures.
The simplest measure of centrality ofVr is the number of its neighbors (the num-
ber of direct trade connections region r has), namely its degree. The standardized
degree centrality of a vertex is its degree divided by the maximum possible degree
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Newman, 2003; Jackson, 2008):
Cdr =
dr
n−1 =
∑ns 6=r lrs
n−1 (1)
Since, in simple directed graphs like the one depicted in figure 2, a region can
be both an exporter (a sender) and an importer (a receiver), we can compute both
the in-degree of a region, dr = ∑ns 6=r dsr, as the number of incoming links (imports)
to region r, and the out-degree, dr = ∑ns 6=r drs, as the number of out-going links
(exports) from region r towards its trade partners.
Imposing the condition w> 25 as a reasonable threshold that maintain the char-
acteristics of the full network without assuming too much homogeneity between
the different European regions (as shown in Table 2), standardized in-degree and
out-degree distributions for the European interregional trade network in 2010 are
shown in Figure 3. In both cases a strongly asymmetric and bimodal distribution
emerges, suggesting that there are two distinct dominant groups of regions with
low and medium standardized degrees, while a small fraction of vertices has a high
in-degree (out-degree).
More specifically, the first ten central regions in terms of in-degree are I`le de
France (FR10), Lombardia (ITC4), Oberbayern (DE21), Stuttgart (DE11), Dussel-
dorf (DEA1), Arnsberg (DEA5), Koln (DEA2), Giessen (DE71), Cataluna (ES51)
and Karlsruhe (DE12), with a level of Cdr > 0.63 (the regions are inner linked with
a little bit more than 63% of possible regional partners, with a strength of w> 25),
with German landers at a core of European markets in terms of imports. If we look
at regions as exporters, the first ten regions are, respectively, ITC4, DE21, DE11,
DE71, DEA5, DE12, NL33, DEA1, DE25, DE13, with a level ofCdr > 0.66 (the re-
gions are outer linked with a little bit more than 66% of possible regional partners,
with a strength of w > 25), with the role of Germany even more prominent. Seven
out of ten regions are in the both top-tens, the more connected importing regions are
also the most connected exporting regions. More broadly, in-degree and out-degree
are positively correlated with a Pearson coefficient of 0.9. There are however some
notable exceptions: UK12 is in the top-twenty as an importer, ranking 95th as an
exporter.
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Fig. 3 In-Degree and out-degree distribution. Histogram and density plots
The scatter plot of in-degree versus out-degree (both derived using equation 1) is
depicted in figure 4. The French region of I`le de France (FR10), as previously men-
tioned, is the EU region with highest In-degree, a characteristic strictly associated
with its level of regional GDP, highlighted by the dimension of the dot represent-
ing the position of the region in the deegre-space. The German regions of Stuttgart
(DE11) and Oberbayern (DE21) and the Italian region of Lombardia (ITC4) lead
the EU regions in terms of out-degree. The scatter plot clearly confirms the positive
correlation between In-degree and Out-degree, but also shows the level of dispersion
of the EU regional trade centralities. A notable case is the one of the Great Britain
regions of Inner London (UKI1) and Outer London (UKI2) showing a level of in-
degree much higher than the level of out-degree, depending on the lesser importance
of regional manufacturing with respect to service production and trade.
Beyond the degree distribution itself, it is interesting to understand the manner
in which regions of different degrees are linked with each other. To this end, we
plot the average neighbor degree versus vertex degree (Figure 5). This plot suggests
that, while there is a tendency for regions of higher degrees to link with similar
regions, nodes of intermediate degree tend to link with regions of both intermediate
and higher degrees. This issue can be better analyzed using a global measure of
centrality, namely the eigenvector centrality.4
4 The degree centrality (Cdr ) is classified as a local measure of centrality since it takes into con-
sideration only the direct links of a node, its nearest neighborhood, regardless of the position of
the node in the network’s structure. Contrary to the local measures, global measures of centrality
uncover the effect of others at a higher level of connection, including the direct and the indirect
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Fig. 4 Scatterplot of in-degree and out-degree centralities. The scatterplot confronts the level of
in-degree with the level of out-degree for each EU region. Regions of the same country share the
same color. The size of the dots is proportional to regional GDP. Dots are labeled according to
NUT-2 codes.
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Fig. 5 Average neighbor degree versus vertex degree (log-log scale)
Figure 6 shows the Eigenvector centrality distribution for the European inter-
regional trade network. Again a right skewed bimodal distribution emerges. The
ten most central regions (in terms of Eigenvector centrality) are, in order, I`le de
France (FR10), Oberbayern (DE21), Lombardia (ITC4), Stuttgart (DE11), Dus-
seldorf (DEA1), Arnsberg (DEA5), Koln (DEA2), Karlsruhe (DE12), Darmstadt
(DE71) and Rhone-Alpes (FR71).
Last but not least, we explore the new dataset through network analysis to evalu-
ate to what extent two regions that both trade with a third region are likely to trade
with each other as well. This notion corresponds to the social network concept of
transitivity and can be captured numerically through an enumeration of the propor-
tion of vertex triples that form triangles (i.e., all three vertex pairs are connected
by edges), typically summarized in a so-called clustering coefficient. Table 2 shows
that, with w> 25, about 70% of the connected triples close to form triangles. With
higher thresholds of exports (w> 500, w> 1000 and w> 2500), this fraction steeply
decreases.
More deeply, the role of the third region can be studied (and properties can be
tested) using the Triad Census (the count of the various type of triads in the network)
as a tool (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Classical triad census analysis applies to
single, directed and binary network, and we will follow the tradition in this respect.
effect of potentially all nodes in the network. In particular, the eigenvector centrality captures the
idea that the more central the neighbors of a vertex are, the more central that vertex itself is. In
other words, eigenvector centrality gives greater weight to a node the more it is connected to other
highly connected nodes. Thus, it is often interpreted as measuring a node’s network importance.
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Fig. 6 Eigenvector centrality distribution
Taking the three nodes Vs, Vr and Vk, where s 6= r 6= k, we can call them a triple, if
we also consider the presence or absence of links between the different nodes we
have a triad. Tsrk is the triad involving Vs, Vr and Vk. If the network is composed of
n nodes, there are
(
n
3
)
= n(n−1)(n−2)6 triads. In the EU regional trade network there
are, therefore, 3,136,805 triads.
As far as possible realizations of triads, since there are three nodes in a triad,
and each node can be connected to two other nodes, this give rise to 6 possible
links. Since each link can be present or absent, there are 26 = 64 possible realiza-
tions of the triads. Excluding isomorphic cases (e.g. if Vs, Vr and Vk are not linked,
Tsrk,Trks and Tksr are isomorphic), we remain with 16 isomorphism classes for 64
different triad states. These classes, represented in figure 7, range from the null sub-
graph to the subgraph in which all three dyads formed by the vertices in the triad
have mutual directed links. The figure is from Wasserman and Faust (1994, p. 566)
as reproduced in De Nooy, Mrvar, and Batagelj (2011). The different classes are la-
beled with as many as four characters, according to the M-A-N labeling scheme of
Holland and Leinhardt (1970), where the first character gives the number of Mutual
dyads in the triad, the second the Asymmetric ones, the third the number of Null
dyads, and lastly, the forth one, if present, is used to distinguish further among the
types (e.g. the two 030 triads - panel 9 and 10 in figure 7 - can be distinguished by
the transitivity of the dyad 9 and the cyclic links of dyad 10). The four letters in the
forth character are “U” (for up), “D” (for down), “T” (for transitive) and “C” (for
cyclic).
For every network it is possible to calculate the frequencies of the 16 classes.
In Table 2 we report the triad census for the European regional trade network at
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Fig. 7 Triads in a digraph. The figure is from Wasserman and Faust (1994, p. 566) as reproduced in
De Nooy, Mrvar, and Batagelj (2011). The triples of directional relations are called triads. Among
the numbers at the bottom of each panel, the first one is progressive from 1 to 16 and indicates
all the possible cases of triads, while the second is the M-A-N labeling scheme of Holland and
Leinhardt (1970): the first character gives the number of Mutual dyads in the triad, the second the
Asymmetric ones, the third the number of Null dyads, and lastly, the forth one, if present, is used
to distinguish further among the types (e.g. 003 triad as 0 Mutuals, 0 Asymmetrics and 3 Nulls).
different levels of threshold w. Every triadic census, reported in columns 4 to 8, is
calculated excluding isolated regions and zero valued edges, e.g., in the last column
of Table 2 the triad census is calculated for the 13 regions and 12 edges of the trade
network with w> 2500. Here we discuss only our preferred structure (e.g., w> 25
mln.).
The fifth column in Table 2 shows that the large majority of triads in the EU
regional trade is represented by empty-graph structures (corresponding to the 003
MAN code, row 1 in Table 2); followed by single and mutual edges (012 and 102
MAN codes, rows 2 and 3 inTable 2); and then by stars (in-stars 021U, out-stars
021D, and especially mutual stars, 201 MAN code, rows 5, 4 and 11 in Table 2).
One noteworthy characteristic of the EU regional trade network is the prevalence of
mutual edge + (double) Out structures (111U and 120U MAN codes, rows 8 and 13
in Table 2) over mutual edge + (double) In structures (111D and 120D MAN codes,
rows 7 and 12 in Table 2). It seems that when two regions establish a mutual trade
relationship this fosters them to export to, more that to import from, a third region.
This tendency persists at different level of threshold w (as can be seen in columns
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MAN code Figure Class Full w>25 mln. w>500 mln. w>1000 mln. w>2500 mln.
1 003 Empty graph 14 1,040,546 1,549,950 147,072 186
2 012 Single edge 0 487,976 88,052 10,440 73
3 102 Mutual edge 182 737,954 30,906 2,907 6
4 021D Out-star 1 32,297 2,665 327 3
5 021U In-star 0 20,621 806 175 10
6 021C Line 0 29,254 1,407 179 3
7 111D Mutual edge + In 0 87,483 1,314 164 1
8 111U Mutual edge + Out 0 152,936 2,562 276 4
9 030T Transitive 1 13,299 151 11 0
10 030C Cycle 0 664 7 0 0
11 201 Mutual-star 7,808 157,167 965 95 0
12 120D Mutual edge + double In 121 17,185 63 2 0
13 120U Mutual edge + double Out 248 36,178 158 19 0
14 120C Mutual edge + Cycle 21 16,694 131 4 0
15 210 Almost complete graph 15,645 125,402 338 23 0
16 300 Complete graph 3,112,764 145,904 105 6 0
Table 2 Triad census. Every triadic census (columns 4-8) is calculated excluding isolated regions
and zero valued edges.
6-8 in Table 2). This aspect of the EU regional trade network will be discussed and
theoretically motivated in the subsequent sections.
Overall, the evidence emerging from our analysis suggests interesting insights on
the interregional trade network in Europe, which also inform our theoretical model
described in the following sections. First, it emerges that the interregional trade net-
work (and, thus, the European economic integration) is far from being complete
since most regions do not trade (or trade with a very low intensity) with all other
regions, but they rather select their partners. This first stylized fact clearly emerges
once we neglect bilateral trade flows lower than 25 millions of euros. Second, inter-
regional trade flows, partners and links in Europe are strongly heterogeneous, with
a relatively small number of regions playing a central role in the network structure,
both in terms of number of links and amount of intra-Europe trade flows accounted.
In particular, our findings clearly show that distance matters also in trade between
regions and that the emerging clusters are characterized by geographic proximity.
Specifically, the national homogeneity of clusters gives evidence that national bor-
ders are relevant for regional analysis of EU trade flows. Finally, from the triadic
census analysis it emerges that the tendency to reciprocate trade links (i.e., closing
triangles) is limited and mutual edge patterns tend to prevail.
3 General Framework
In this Section, we build a three-region linear new economic geography (NEG)
model along the lines of the evidence emerged from the empirical analysis of the
EU regional trade network.
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3.1 Basic Assumptions
The economy is composed of three regions (labeled suitably r, s and k). There are
two sectors, Agriculture (A-sector) and Manufacturing (M-sector). Workers and en-
trepreneurs are the two types of agents operating in the economy, each of them is
endowed with a factor of production, unskilled labor (L-factor) and human capital
(E-factor).5 L can be used in both sectors; whereas E is specific to M. Production in
the A-sector involves a homogeneous good, whereas in the M-sector the output con-
sists of N differentiated varieties. The three regions are symmetric – they have the
same endowment of L and are characterized by the same production technology and
consumption preferences – except for their distance. This translates into regional
differences in trade costs.
3.2 Production
The A-sector is characterized by perfect competition and constant returns to scale.
The production of 1 unit of the homogeneous good requires only unskilled work-
ers as an input. Without loss of generality, we assume that 1 unit of labor gives 1
unit of output. The A-good is also chosen as nume´raire. In the M-sector, instead,
(Dixit-Stiglitz) monopolistic competition and increasing returns prevail. In this sec-
tor, identical firms produce differentiated varieties with the same technology in-
volving a fixed component, 1 entrepreneur, and a variable component, η units of
unskilled labor for each unit of the differentiated variety. Total cost TC for a firm i
producing qi output units corresponds to:
TC(qi) = pii+wηqi
where w is the wage rate, pii represents the remuneration of the entrepreneur and,
when the zero profit condition holds, the operating profit. Given consumers’ prefer-
ence for variety (see below) and increasing returns, each firm will always produce
a variety different from those produced by the other firms (no economies of scope
5 A crucial difference between human and, for example, knowledge capital is that the former is em-
bodied into the owner, whereas the second is separated. In a NEG model, this difference enters into
play only when factor migration is allowed. When human capital is considered, changes in real in-
comes alters the migration choice also via the so-called “price index effect” so that changes in local
prices may affect the long-run distribution of the industrial sector. Instead, when knowledge capi-
tal is concerned, factor movements are only driven by regional nominal profit differentials. A new
economic geography (NEG) model in which the mobile factor is human capital (or, alternatively,
skilled labor or entrepreneurship) is known as Footloose Entrepreneur (FE) model (developed orig-
inally in Forslid and Ottaviano, 2003); a NEG model in which the mobile factor is separated from
the owner (such as physical or knowledge capital) is labeled Footloose Capital (FC) model (devel-
oped firstly in Martin and Rogers, 1995). As mentioned above, this distinction becomes relevant
moving from the short to the long-run when factor migration is allowed. Even if the basic structure
of the model is equivalent for FC and FE models, we consider the factor specific to the M-sector
an entrepreneur.
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are allowed). Moreover, since one entrepreneur is required for each manufacturing
firm, the total number of firms/varieties, N, always equates the total number of en-
trepreneurs, E = N. Denoting by λr the share of entrepreneurs located in region r
the number of regional varieties produced in that region is:
nr = λrN = λrE.
3.3 Utility function
Following Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002), to represent individual prefer-
ences we adopt a quasi-linear utility function. As we shall see, a crucial difference
of this modeling strategy with respect to the standard CES approach is a CIF price
(price at destination) which falls as the number of local competing firms rises. This
implies a stronger dispersion force (given by the competition effect). Another dif-
ference is that it allows to highlight alternative patterns of trade (autarky, one-way,
two-way trade) as shown by Behrens (2004, 2005b, 2011) and by Okubo, Picard,
and Thisse (2014) for the case of two-region economies.
The utility function is composed of a quadratic part defining the preferences
across the M goods and a linear component for the consumption of the A-good:
U = α
N
∑
i=1
ci−
(
β −δ
2
) N
∑
i=1
c2i −
δ
2
(
N
∑
i=1
ci
)2
+CA (2)
where ci is the consumption choice concerning the variety i; α represents the in-
tensity of preferences for the manufactured varieties, with α > 0; δ represents the
degree of substitutability across those varieties, δ > 0; and where the taste for vari-
ety is measured by the (positive) difference β −δ > 0.
The representative consumer’s budget constraint is:
N
∑
i=1
pici+CA = y+CA (3)
where CA is the individual endowment of the agricultural good which is assumed
sufficiently large to allow for positive consumption of this good in equilibrium; pi is
the price of variety i inclusive of transport costs and y is the income of the individual
agent (unskilled worker or entrepreneur).
3.4 Trade costs
The three regions constitute the nodes of a network economy in which the links
are the flows of commodities (esp. those produced in the M-sector). The existence,
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direction and magnitude of these flows depend on the size of trade costs. There are
three types of flows/links between two regions – labeled let’s say r and s – a one
directional link from r to s, where r is the exporting region and s the importing
region; a one directional link from s to r, where s is the exporting region and r the
importing region; and a bidirectional link between r and s, where both regions export
to and import from the other. Including also the possibility of no links, the maximum
number of possible network structures involving three regions is 64; excluding the
“isomorphic” cases this number reduces to 16 (see the discussion on triad census
above).
Differently from Ago, Isono, and Tabuchi (2006), according to whom the three
regions are equally spaced along a line, and from Behrens (2011), according to
whom two regions in a trade bloc are at the same distance from a third outside
region, we assume that the distance between regions is not necessarily the same.
Moreover, we assume identical bilateral trade costs – so that the cost of trading
industrial commodities from r to s and from s to r is identical, i.e Trs = Tsr – and no
cost of trading goods within a region – that is, Trr = 0. Moreover, we do not assume
an a priori specific trade costs configuration,6 that is, Trs 6= Trk and/or Trk 6= Tsk
and/or Trs 6= Tsk.
Letting r,s, and k the three regions under consideration, the trade cost matrix can
be written as:  0 Trs TrkTrs 0 Tsk
Trk Tsk 0

4 Short-run equilibrium
We limit our analysis to the equilibrium that emerges in the short run, contingent
to given regional shares of entrepreneurs (λr,λs,λk), leaving for future work the
analysis of the entrepreneurial migration processes that characterize the long run.
4.1 Equilibrium determination
Solving forCA the budget constraint (3), substituting into the utility function (2) and
then differentiating with respect to ci, we obtain the following first-order conditions
(i= 1, ...,N):
∂U
∂ci
= α− (β −δ )ci−δ
N
∑
i=1
ci− pi = 0
6 A specific configuration could emerge after empirical analysis. We could have, for example, a
“hub and spoke” structure by letting: Trs ≤ Trk ≤ Tsk, with Trs 6= Trk and/or Trk 6= Tsk. This would
stress the locational advantage of region r (the “hub”) with respect to s and k (the “spokes”).
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from which
pi = α− (β −δ )ci−δ
N
∑
i=1
ci
The linear demand function is
ci(p1, ..., pN) =
α
(N−1)δ +β −
1
β −δ pi+
δ
(β −δ )[(N−1)δ +β ]
N
∑
i=1
pi
= a− (b+ cN)pi+ cP
where P= ∑Ni=1 pi, 0≤ pi ≤ p˜≡ a+cPb+cN and
a≡ α
(N−1)δ +β , b≡
1
(N−1)δ +β , c≡
δ
(β −δ )[(N−1)δ +β ] .
The indirect utility is given by:
V = S+ y+CA
where S corresponds to the consumer’s surplus:
S = U(c(pi), i ∈ [0,N])−
N
∑
i=1
pici(pi)−CA
=
a2N
2b
+
b+ cN
2
N
∑
i=1
p2i −aP−
c
2
P2
The consumer’s demand originating from region s – but it could be region r or
region k, after a suitable change in the subscripts – for a good produced in region r
– but it could be region s or k – is
crs = a− (b+ cN)prs+ cPs
where crs is the demand of a consumer living in region s for a good produced in
region r; prs is the price of a good produced in region r and consumed in region s;
and Ps is the price index in region s, with
Ps = nrprs+nspss+nkpks.
Notice that, following from the assumption of symmetric behavior of firms,
prices differ across regions – segmenting markets – only because of trade costs.
Short-run equilibrium requires that in each segmented market demand equals
supply:
crs = qrs
where qrs is the output produced in region r – but it could be region s or k – that is
brought to a market in region s – but it could be region r or k.
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In order to derive the short-run solutions, we only consider region r (but the
same reasoning applies to region s or k after a suitable change in the subscripts).
The operating profit of a representative firm in region r is:
pir = (prr−η)qrr(Lr+λrE)
+ (prs−η−Trs)qrs(Ls+λsE)
+ (prk−η−Trk)qrk(Lk+λkE).
From the profit maximization procedure and market segmentation, considering fur-
ther than N = E, the first-order conditions follow:
∂pir
∂ prr
= [a+η(b+ cE)+ cPr−2prr(b+ cE)](Lr+λrE) = 0
∂pir
∂ prs
= [a+(η+Trs)(b+ cE)+ cPs−2prs(b+ cE)](Ls+λsE) = 0
∂pir
∂ prk
= [a+(η+Trk)(b+ cE)+ cPk−2prk(b+ cE)](Lk+λkE) = 0
Taking into account trade costs and letting p˜r = a+cPrb+cN > η , profit-maximizing
prices correspond to
prr =
a+ cPr+η(b+ cE)
2(b+ cE)
=
p˜r
2
+
η
2
(4)
prs =
{
a+cPs+(η+Trs)(b+cE)
2(b+cE) =
p˜s
2 +
η
2 +
Trs
2 i f Trs ≤ p˜s−η
p˜s i f Trs > p˜s−η
(5)
prk =
{
a+cPk+(η+Trk)(b+cE)
2(b+cE) =
p˜k
2 +
η
2 +
Trk
2 i f Trk ≤ p˜k−η
p˜k i f Trk > p˜k−η
(6)
where prr is the price that a firm located in r sets in its own market, prs the price that
such a firm sets in market s, prk the price set in market k, p˜s = a+cPsb+cE the reservation
price of a consumer living in region s and p˜k =
a+cPk
b+cE that of a consumer living in
region k.
Using the demand and price functions, we can write:
qrr = (b+ cE)(prr−η) (7)
qrs =
{
(b+ cE)(prs−η−Trs) i f Trs ≤ p˜s−η
0 i f Trs > p˜s−η (8)
qrk =
{
(b+ cE)(prk−η−Trk) i f Trk ≤ p˜k−η
0 i f Trk > p˜k−η (9)
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According to expressions (5)-(6) and (8)-(9), if a firm located in r quotes in mar-
ket s (or in market k), a price larger than the reservation price for consumers resident
in s (or in k), the export from region r to region s (or k) is zero.7 The boundary con-
dition for trade as reported in these expression is crucial for the following analysis.
The indirect utility for r is given by
Vr = Sr+ y+CA
where Sr corresponds to the consumer’s surplus:
Sr =
a2E
2b
+
b+ cE
2
(
λrp2rr+λsp
2
sr+λkp
2
kr
)
E−aPr− c2P
2
r
We group all the sixteen possible network structures created by the trade flows
between the regions into four cases: i) no trade occurs between all the regions; ii)
one-way or two-way trade occurs between region r and s and region k is in au-
tarky; iii) one-way or two-way trade occurs between regions r and s and r and k,
but regions s and k do not trade with each other (what is called in the triad census
terminology a “star” structure); iv) one-way or two-way trade occurs between any
two-regions in the economy. For all network structures we derive the relevant con-
ditions as determined by the relationship between trade costs and the distribution
of the industrial activity. Some specific cases will be developed in some detail to
understand the effects on the three regions of the creation of a new link. As we shall
see, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the trade network structures and
the triad census taxonomy so that we can match each trade network configuration to
a triad as reported in Figure 7.
4.2 Case 1) All autarkic regions
First we consider the case in which all the regions are in autarky. This corresponds
to triad 1 in Figure 7. Due to the isomorphic properties, we focus only on region r.
Region r is in autarky when conditions Trs > p˜s− η and Trk > p˜k − η apply.
Using the equations (4), (5) and (6) and the expression for the reservation price,
these “no-trade” conditions can be written as:
Trs >
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλsE
= T˜s and Trk >
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλkE
= T˜k
where ∂ T˜s∂λs =−
2(a−ηb)
(2b+cλsE)2
cE < 0 and ∂ T˜k∂λk =−
2(a−ηb)
(2b+cλkE)2
cE < 0.
7 See Behrens (2004, 2005b, 2011). On the empirical relevance of the zero in the trade flow matrix,
see Melitz (2003).
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These results have two important implications: i) a lower degree of local compe-
tition increases the likelihood of interregional trade – making more permeable the
local market in s (or in k) for firms located in r; ii) reducing distance – i.e. trade
costs – between regions r and s (or between r and k) has a similar impact. That is,
closer regions have a more accessible market.
If trade costs are too high, then no trade occurs among the three regions and firms
only sell in the local market. From (4), (5) and (6), considering the linear demand
non-negativity constraint, we obtain the price index for region r:
Pr =
a(2−λr)+ηλr(b+ cE)
2b+ cλrE
E
and the equilibrium prices and quantities:8
prr =
a+η(b+ cλrE)
2b+ cλrE
qrr = (b+ cE)(prr−η)
prs = 2pss−η qrs = 0
prk = 2pkk−η qrk = 0
As shown by these expressions, the equilibrium prices and quantities depend
negatively on the number of local firms λr. This is a manifestation of the so-called
local competition effect: the larger is the number of firms competing in the local
market, the lower the price firms are able to set (and the smaller the output they are
able to sell).
Taking into account our symmetry assumption, according to which the regions
are endowed with the same number of L, the equilibrium short-run profit for a firm
located in region r, which sells only to the local market, corresponds to:9
pir = (prr−η)2(b+ cE)
(
L
3
+λrE
)
= (b+ cE)
(
a−ηb
2b+ cλrE
)2(L
3
+λrE
)
Finally, we obtain the indirect utility of an entrepreneur resident in r:
Vr = Sr+pir+CA =
(a−ηb)2(b+ cE)[3λrE(3b+ cλrE)+2bL]
6b(2b+ cλrE)2
+CA
8 Note that analogous expressions can be obtained for s or for k by simple switching r and s or r
and k.
9 Notice that the assumption of identical workers population has no significant impact on the
short-run analysis and it can be easily removed; whereas in the long run, it determines the regional
entrepreneurial shares and, via these shares, the trade flows.
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4.3 Case 2) Trade only occurs between two regions
We now consider the case where (one-way or two-way) trade occurs but only be-
tween two regions. This implies that, because of high trade costs, the third region
has no trade links with the other two. We focus on the possible links between regions
r and s; the region in autarky is, therefore, k. Due to the isomorphic properties, the
same analysis applies for the links between regions r and k (with s in autarky) or
regions s and k (with r in autarky).
There are two subcases: 2.A) one-way trade from region r to region s (isomorphic
to the link going in the opposite direction from s to r) corresponding to triad 2 in
Figure 7; and 2.B) two-way trade between r and s, corresponding to triad 3.
Considering the subcase 2.A), from equations (4) and (5)-(6), we deduce that
one-way trade from region r to region s occurs as long as:
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλrE
= T˜r < Trs ≤ T˜s = 2(a−ηb)2b+ cλsE (10)
That is, the region with the larger share of entrepreneurs has a higher chance to
be the exporting region, taking advantage of the lower competition in the destination
market.
When only one-way trade from region r to region s is allowed, then firms in re-
gion r are able to sell both in their local market and in the outside market s. Firms in
region s, as before, only produce for the local market but now they have to compete
not only with each other but also with firms located in r.
We also derive the conditions of “no trade” between regions r and k and between
regions s and k:
max
(
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλrE
,
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλkE
)
= max
(
T˜r, T˜k
)
< Trk, (11)
max
(
2(a−ηb)+ cEλrTrs
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
,
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλkE
)
= max
(
T˜ks, T˜k
)
< Tsk. (12)
Looking at the expression (11), we note that the boundary condition for a one-
directional link from region k to region s is more restrictive than before, T˜ks < T˜s
since Trs < T˜s, taking into account the competition coming from the third region r.
Moreover, from these conditions, it follows that the distance from r to s is shorter
than the distance from s to k (Trs < Tsk). This can be proven considering that (i) Trs ≤
T˜ks from the condition Trs ≤ T˜s in (10) and (ii) T˜ks < Tsk from (12). Putting together
(i) and (ii), we have Trs < Tsk.
The price indexes when only one-way trade from r to s occurs are:
Pr =
a(2−λr)+ηλr(b+ cE)
2b+ cλrE
E
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Ps =
a[2− (λr+λs)]+ [η(λr+λs)+Trsλr](b+ cE)
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
E
Pk =
a(2−λk)+ηλk(b+ cE)
2b+ cλkE
E
and the equilibrium prices and quantities:
prr =
a+η(b+ cλrE)
2b+ cλrE
qrr = (b+ cE)(prr−η)
pss =
a+η [b+ c(λr+λs)E]+ Trs2 cλrE
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
qss = (b+ cE)(pss−η)
pkk =
a+η(b+ cλkE)
2b+ cλkE
qkk = (b+ cE)(pkk−η)
prs = pss+
Trs
2
qrs = (b+ cE)(prs−η−Trs)
prk = 2pkk−η qrk = 0
psr = 2prr−η qsr = 0
psk = 2pkk−η qsk = 0
pkr = 2prr−η qkr = 0
pks = 2pss−η qks = 0
As these equations show, the creation of a one-directional trade link from region
r to region s affects negatively the price applied by local firms in region s. Moreover,
the competition effect is reinforced since now they have to compete not only with
the other local firms but also with the firms located in region r.
Due to lack of space, from now on we do not derive explicit results for profits
and indirect utilities – given that, especially the second ones become more and more
complicated as the number of links increases. Brief comments on the short-run ef-
fects of a link creation on all the regions will be provided for some of the trade
network configurations. Indeed, as we shall see, the creation of a link may have an
effect not only on the two regions involved but also on the third. Analogously, the
presence of a third region may alter the effect of the new link on the two regions
directly involved. This is a version of the so-called “third-region” effect.
The equilibrium profits for the case of one-way trade from r to s are:
pir = (b+ cE)
[
(prr−η)2
(
L
3
+λrE
)
+(prs−η−Trs)2
(
L
3
+λsE
)]
pis = (b+ cE)
[
(pss−η)2
(
L
3
+λsE
)]
pik = (b+ cE)(pkk−η)2
(
L
3
+λkE
)
.
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The effect of the creation of a one-directional link (i.e. one-way trade or exports)
from region r to region s has a positive effect on the welfare of region r (the export-
ing region). Indeed, the opening of the new market (the one in region s) – and the
generation of the profit accruing from it – causes an increase in the overall profit of
the r-firms (i.e. the firms located in region r). The impact on the welfare of region s
(the importing region), instead, is ambiguous due to the counterbalancing of two op-
posite effects: the one on the consumer’s surplus – that we call “the surplus effect”
– which is positive and the one on profits – that we call “the profit effect” – which
is negative. The first is induced by the larger availability of manufactured goods
traded in the local market; whereas the second by the stronger competition that the
s-firms have to suffer in the local market coming from the r-firms. The “surplus ef-
fect”, which is smaller at the beginning of the integration process, may overcome
the “profit effect”, with further trade liberalization, depending on parameter values
and on the regional distribution of the industrial sector.
Moving on to the subcase 2.B), when trade costs are reduced enough, two-way
trade between region r and s is allowed, implying that with respect to the previous
situation, now also firms in s are able to compete in both markets. Two-way trade
from region r to region s occurs as long as
Trs < min
(
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλrE
,
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλsE
)
= min
(
T˜r, T˜s
)
. (13)
For future reference, we also derive the conditions for “no trade” between region
r and k and between region s and k:
max
(
2(a−ηb)+ cEλsTrs
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
,
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλkE
)
= max
(
T˜kr, T˜k
)
< Trk, (14)
max
(
2(a−ηb)+ cEλrTrs
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
,
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλkE
)
= max
(
T˜ks, T˜k
)
< Tsk. (15)
First of all we notice that, due to additional competition coming from the s-firms
operating in the market in region r, also the condition for a one directional link from
region k to region r is more restrictive. Second, from the above conditions, it follows
that the trade distance between r and s is the shortest, that is, Trs<min(Trk,Tsk). This
can be proven considering that, as shown before, Trs < Tsk. Moreover, consider that
(i) Trs < T˜kr from the condition Trs ≤ T˜r in (13); and (ii) T˜kr < Trk from (14). Putting
together (i) and (ii), we have that Trs < Trk as well.
The price indexes when two-way trade from r to s occurs are:
Pr =
a[2− (λr+λs)]+ [η(λr+λs)+Tsrλs](b+ cE)
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
E
Ps =
a[2− (λr+λs)]+ [η(λr+λs)+Tsrλr](b+ cE)
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
E
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Pk =
a(2−λk)+ηλk(b+ cE)
2b+ cλkE
E
and the equilibrium prices and quantities:
prr =
a+η [b+ c(λr+λs)E]+ Trs2 cλsE
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
qrr = (b+ cE)(prr−η)
pss =
a+η [b+ c(λr+λs)E]+ Trs2 cλrE
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
qss = (b+ cE)(pss−η)
pkk =
a+η(b+ cλkE)
2b+ cλkE
qkk = (b+ cE)(pkk−η)
prs = pss+
Trs
2
qrs = (b+ cE)(prs−η−Trs)
prk = 2pkk−η qrk = 0
psr = prr+
Trs
2
qsr = (b+ cE)(psr−η−Trs)
psk = 2pkk−η qsk = 0
pkr = 2prr−η qkr = 0
pks = 2pss−η qks = 0
As these equations show, the effect of the link creation from s to r affects prr:
compared with the previous case, a firm located in r applies a lower price in the
local market and faces competition not only from local firms but also from those
located in region s.
The equilibrium profits for the case of two-way trade between r and s are:
pir = (b+ cE)
[
(prr−η)2
(
L
3
+λrE
)
+(prs−η−Trs)2
(
L
3
+λsE
)]
pis = (b+ cE)
[
(pss−η)2
(
L
3
+λsE
)
+(psr−η−Trs)2
(
L
3
+λrE
)]
pik = (b+ cE)(pkk−η)2
(
L
3
+λkE
)
The effect of the creation of a “link back” from region s to region r, generating
two-way trade between the two regions, has an ambiguous impact on region r due
the counterbalancing of the two effects mentioned above: The first effect, on profit,
is negative – due to the additional competition in the local market coming from
the s-firms –; whereas the second, on the consumer’s surplus, is positive due to the
larger availability of manufactured commodities for the r-consumers (the consumers
living in region r). The impact on region s, instead, is positive due to the additional
profits accruing to the s-firms from the market located in r.
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4.4 Case 3) One of the regions trade with the other two but the
other two do not trade with each other.
This third case includes six possible network structures collected in two groups. To
the first group, composed of three cases, belong those structures characterized by
the existence of one-directional links only, that is, by one-way trade flows only; to
the second group belong those structures characterized by one or two bidirectional
links. In what follows, we assume that the region r always trade with the other two
but these, regions s and k, do not trade with each other. The conditions determining
the first group of network structures are listed below:
3.A.1 One-way trade from region r to region s and from region r to region k –
corresponding to triad 4 in Figure 7 — occurs as long as:
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλrE
= T˜r < Trs ≤ T˜s = 2(a−ηb)2b+ cλsE
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλrE
= T˜r < Trk ≤ T˜k = 2(a−ηb)2b+ cλkE
3.A.2 One-way trade from region r to region s and from region k to region r –
corresponding to triad 6 in Figure 7 – occurs as long as:
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλrE
= T˜r < Trs ≤ T˜s = 2(a−ηb)2b+ cλsE
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλkE
= T˜k < Trk ≤ T˜r = 2(a−ηb)2b+ cλrE
3.A.3. One-way trade from region s to region r and from region k to region r –
corresponding to Triad 5 in Figure 7 – occurs as long as:
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλsE
= T˜s < Trs ≤ T˜sr = 2(a−ηb)+ cEλkTrk2b+ c(λr+λk)E
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλkE
= T˜k < Trk ≤ T˜kr = 2(a−ηb)+ cEλsTrs2b+ c(λr+λs)E
As before, the inequalities holding for cases 3.A.1-3.A.2 confirm that the region
with the smaller (larger) share of entrepreneurs has a higher chance to be the import-
ing (exporting) region. Looking at case 3.A.3, we note that the boundary condition
for a one-directional link from region s (k) to region r takes into account the com-
petition coming from the the third region k (s).
An important remark is useful at this stage: there are many ways in which new
links can be added to an existing network structure, taking into account all the iso-
morphic configurations. Therefore the way we are proceeding (the order we are
using) in our analysis – adding one link after the other and looking at the conse-
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quences (for example on prices, profits and short-run welfare) of a new link – is not
the only possible.
In what follows we study in detail the case 3.A.1 (leaving the analysis of cases
3.2 and 3.A.3 to another contribution).
The price indexes when one-way trade from r to s and from to r to k occurs are:
Pr =
a(2−λr)+ηλr(b+ cE)
2b+ cλrE
E
Ps =
a[2− (λr+λs)]+ [η(λr+λs)+Trsλr](b+ cE)
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
E
Pk =
a[2− (λr+λk)]+ [η(λr+λk)+Trkλr](b+ cE)
2b+ c(λr+λk)E
E
and the equilibrium prices and quantities:
prr =
a+η(b+ cλrE)
2b+ cλrE
qrr = (b+ cE)(prr−η)
pss =
a+η [b+ c(λr+λs)E]+ Trs2 cλrE
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
qss = (b+ cE)(pss−η)
pkk =
a+η [b+ c(λr+λk)E]+ Trk2 cλrE
2b+ c(λr+λk)E
qkk = (b+ cE)(pkk−η)
prs = pss+
Trs
2
qrs = (b+ cE)(prs−η−Trs)
prk = pkk+
Trk
2
qrk = (b+ cE)(prk−η−Trk)
psr = 2prr−η qsr = 0
psk = 2pkk−η qsk = 0
pkr = 2prr−η qkr = 0
pks = 2pss−η qks = 0
As we have seen before, looking at the price applied by firms located in region
k, the creation of a one directional link from r to s reduces pkk because now local
firms located in region k have to face additional competition from the firms located
in r.
The equilibrium profits for the case of one-way trade from r to s and from to r to
k are:
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pir = (prr−η)2
(
L
3
+λrE
)
(b+ cE)
+ (prs−η−Trs)2
(
L
3
+λsE
)
(b+ cE)
+ (prk−η−Trk)2
(
L
3
+λkE
)
(b+ cE)
pis = (b+ cE)(pss−η)2
(
L
3
+λsE
)
pik = (b+ cE)(pkk−η)2
(
L
3
+λkE
)
Concerning the welfare analysis, adding a one-directional link from r to k has
a positive effect on r with an increase in profits for firms and in the surplus for
consumers located in that region. As before, the effect of trade liberalization on k is
ambiguous with an initial reduction in welfare (with respect to the case of autarky).
With further trade liberalization welfare increases and it may rise above the autarky
level depending on parameter values and on the distribution of entrepreneurs.
Turning to the case in which one or two bidirectional links exist, three are the
possible configurations. The corresponding “trade conditions” are reported below:
3.B.1. Two-way trade between r and s and one-way trade from r to k – corre-
sponding to triad 8 in Figure 7 – occurs as long as:
Trs ≤min
(
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλrE
,
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλsE
)
= min
(
T˜r, T˜s
)
(16)
2(a−ηb)+ cEλsTrs
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
= T˜kr < Trk ≤ T˜k = 2(a−ηb)2b+ cλkE (17)
Moreover, for future reference, we add the condition of “no trade” between s and
k:
Tsk > max
(
2(a−ηb)+ cEλrTrk
2b+ c(λr+λk)E
,
2(a−ηb)+ cEλrTrs
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
)
= max
(
T˜sk, T˜ks
)
(18)
3.B.2. Two-way trade between r and s and one-way trade from k to r – corre-
sponding to triad 7 in Figure 7 – occurs as long as:
Trs ≤min
(
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλrE
,
2(a−ηb)+ cEλkTrk
2b+ c(λr+λk)E
)
= min
(
T˜r, T˜sr
)
(19)
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλkE
= T˜k < Trk ≤ T˜kr = 2(a−ηb)+ cEλsTrs2b+ c(λr+λs)E (20)
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Moreover, for future reference, we add the condition of ”no trade” between s and
k:
Tsk > max
(
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλkE
,
2(a−ηb)+ cEλrTrs
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
)
= max
(
T˜k, T˜ks
)
(21)
3.B.3. Two-way trade between r and s and between r and k – corresponding to
triad 11 in Figure 7 – occurs as long as:
Trs ≤ min
(
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλrE
,
2(a−ηb)+ cEλkTrk
2b+ c(λr+λk)E
)
= min
(
T˜r, T˜sr
)
Trk ≤ min
(
2(a−ηb)+ cEλsTrs
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
,
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλkE
)
= min
(
T˜rk, T˜k
)
We study in some detail cases 3.B.1 and 3.B.3. Considering case 3.B.1, the price
indexes when two-way trade between r to s and one-way trade from r to k occur are:
Pr =
a[2− (λr+λs)]+ [η(λr+λs)+Trsλs](b+ cE)
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
E
Ps =
a[2− (λr+λs)]+ [η(λr+λs)+Trsλr](b+ cE)
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
E
Pk =
a[2− (λr+λk)]+ [η(λr+λk)+Trkλr](b+ cE)
2b+ c(λr+λk)E
E
and the equilibrium prices and quantities:
prr =
a+η [b+ c(λr+λs)E]+ Trs2 cλsE
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
qrr = (b+ cE)(prr−η)
pss =
a+η [b+ c(λr+λs)E]+ Trs2 cλrE
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
qss = (b+ cE)(pss−η)
pkk =
a+η [b+ c(λr+λk)E]+ Trk2 cλrE
2b+ c(λr+λk)E
qkk = (b+ cE)(pkk−η)
prs = pss+
Trs
2
qrs = (b+ cE)(prs−η−Trs)
prk = pkk+
Trk
2
qrk = (b+ cE)(prk−η−Trk)
psr = prr+
Trs
2
qsr = (b+ cE)(psr−η−Trs)
psk = 2pkk−η qsk = 0
pkr = 2prr−η qkr = 0
pks = 2pss−η qks = 0
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The equilibrium profits for the case of two-way trade from r to s and one-way
trade from r to k are:
pir = (prr−η)2
(
L
3
+λrE
)
(b+ cE)
+ (prs−η−Trs)2
(
L
3
+λsE
)
(b+ cE)
+ (prk−η−Trk)2
(
L
3
+λkE
)
(b+ cE)
pis = (b+ cE)
[
(pss−η)2
(
L
3
+λsE
)
+(psr−η−Trs)2
(
L
3
+λrE
)]
pik = (b+ cE)(pkk−η)2
(
L
3
+λkE
)
The effect of creating a link from r (the exporting region) to k (the importing
region) on these two regions – as trade costs are reduced below the threshold – are
analogous to those highlighted previously. It is positive on r and ambiguous on k
depending on the distribution of entrepreneurs and on parameter values; whereas
the effect on the welfare of the third region – at least in the short-run – is nil.
Moving on to case 3.B.3, the price indexes when two-way trade between r and s
and from r to k occur are:
Pr =
a+[η+Trsλs+Trkλk](b+ cE)
2b+ cE
E
Ps =
a[2− (λr+λs)]+ [η(λr+λs)+Trsλr](b+ cE)
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
E
Pk =
a[2− (λr+λk)]+ [η(λr+λk)+Trkλr](b+ cE)
2b+ c(λr+λk)E
E
and the equilibrium prices and quantities:
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prr =
a+η(b+ cE)+
(
Trs
2 λs+
Trk
2 λk
)
cE
2b+ cE
qrr = (b+ cE)(prr−η)
pss =
a+η [b+ c(λr+λs)E]+ Trs2 cλrE
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
qss = (b+ cE)(pss−η)
pkk =
a+η [b+ c(λr+λk)E]+ Trk2 cλrE
2b+ c(λr+λk)E
qkk = (b+ cE)(pkk−η)
prs = pss+
Trs
2
qrs = (b+ cE)(prs−η−Trs)...
prk = pkk+
Trk
2
qrk = (b+ cE)(prk−η−Trk)
psr = prr+
Trs
2
qsr = (b+ cE)(psr−η−Trs)
psk = 2pkk−η qsk = 0
pkr = prr+
Trk
2
qkr = (b+ cE)(pkr−η−Trk)
pks = 2pss−η qks = 0
The equilibrium profits for the case of two-way trade between r and s and from
r to k are:
pir = (prr−η)2
(
L
3
+λrE
)
(b+ cE)
+ (prs−η−Trs)2
(
L
3
+λsE
)
(b+ cE)
+ (prk−η−Trk)2
(
L
3
+λkE
)
(b+ cE)
pis = (b+ cE)
[
(pss−η)2
(
L
3
+λsE
)
+(psr−η−Trs)2
(
L
3
+λrE
)]
pik = (b+ cE)
[
(pkk−η)2
(
L
3
+λkE
)
+(psk−η−Trk)2
(
L
3
+λkE
)]
Comparing the first expression with the previous case, the effect of adding a link
from k to r on the profits of region r is negative; whereas the effect on the overall
welfare for region r is difficult to assess due to the counterbalancing of the negative
effect on profits and the positive effect on the consumer’s surplus. The effect on
region s’ welfare is negative: due to the negative impact on profits; whereas the
effect on consumer’s surplus is zero for that region. The opposite holds for region k,
the overall effect on welfare is positive: this is due to the positive impact on profit;
whereas also for this region the impact on the consumer’s surplus is nil.
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4.5 Case 4) one-way trade or two-way trade is present between any
two region.
This fourth case includes seven possible network structures that can be divided into
four groups: 4.A) the first group is composed of two structures characterized by the
existence of only one-directional links; 4.B) the second of three structures charac-
terized by the existence of one bidirectional link and two one-directional links; 4.C)
the third of a single structure characterized by the existence of two bidirectional
links and one directional link; 4.D) and the fourth of the single structure character-
ized by all bidirectional links. The conditions determining these network structures
are reported below:
4.A. All regions are involved in one-way trade:
4.A.1 One way trade from r to s, from r to k and from s to k – corresponding to
triad 9 in Figure 7 – occurs as long as:
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλrE
= T˜r < Trs ≤ T˜s = 2(a−ηb)2b+ cλsE
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλrE
= T˜r < Trk ≤ T˜rk = 2(a−ηb)+ cEλsTrs2b+ c(λs+λk)E
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλsE
= T˜s < Tsk ≤ T˜sk = 2(a−ηb)+ cEλrTrs2b+ c(λr+λk)E
4.A.2 One way trade from r to s, from k to r and from s to k – corresponding to
triad 10 in Figure 7 – occurs as long as:
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλrE
= T˜r < Trs ≤ T˜s = 2(a−ηb)2b+ cλsE
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλkE
= T˜k < Trk ≤ T˜r = 2(a−ηb)2b+ cλrE
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλsE
= T˜s < Tsk ≤ T˜k = 2(a−ηb)2b+ cλkE
4.B. Two regions are involved in two-way trade with each other and in one-way
trade with the third region:
4.B.1 Two-way trade between r and s, one-way trade from r to k and from s to k
– corresponding to triad 13 in Figure 7 – occurs as long as:
Trs < min
(
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλrE
,
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλsE
)
= min
(
T˜r, T˜s
)
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2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλrE
= T˜r < Trk ≤ T˜rk = 2(a−ηb)+ cEλsTrs2b+ c(λs+λk)E
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλsE
= T˜s < Tsk ≤ T˜sk = 2(a−ηb)+ cEλrTrs2b+ c(λr+λk)E
4.B.2 Region r and s are involved in two-way trade between each other; one
way trade from region k to region r and from region s to region k. This structure –
corresponding to triad 14 in Figure 7 – occurs as long as:
Trs ≤min
(
2(a−ηb)+ cEλkTrk
2b+ c(λr+λk)E
,
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλsE
)
= min
(
T˜sr, T˜s
)
2(a−ηb)+ cEλsTrs
2b+ c(λs+λk)E
= T˜rk < Trk ≤ T˜kr = 2(a−ηb)+ cEλsTrk2b+ c(λr+λs)E
2(a−ηb)+ cEλrTrs
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
= T˜ks ≤ Tsk < T˜k = 2(a−ηb)2b+ cλkE
4.B.3 Regions r and s are involved in two-way trade between each other; one
way trade from region k to region r and from region k to region s. This structure –
corresponding to triad 12 in Figure 7 – occurs as long as:
Trs ≤min
(
2(a−ηb)+ cEλkTrk
2b+ c(λr+λk)E
,
2(a−ηb)+ cEλkTsk
2b+ c(λs+λk)E
)
= min
(
T˜sr, T˜rs
)
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλkE
= T˜k < Trk ≤ T˜kr = 2(a−ηb)+ cEλsTrs2b+ c(λr+λs)E
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλkE
= T˜k < Trk ≤ T˜ks = 2(a−ηb)+ cEλrTrs2b+ c(λr+λs)E
4.C. One-way trade between two regions that are both involved in two-way trade
with the third region: Two way trade between r and s and r and k and one way trade
from s to k – corresponding to triad 15 in Figure 7 – occurs as long as:
Trs < min
(
2(a−ηb)+ cEλkTrk
2b+ c(λr+λk)E
,
2(a−ηb)
2b+ cλsE
)
= min
(
T˜sr, T˜s
)
Trk < min
(
2(a−ηb)+ cEλsTrs
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
,
2(a−ηb)+ cEλsTrs
2b+ c(λs+λk)E
)
= min
(
T˜kr, T˜rk
)
2(a−ηb)+ cEλrTrs
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
= T˜ks ≤ Tsk < T˜sk = 2(a−ηb)+ cEλrTrs2b+ c(λr+λk)E
4.D. All regions are involved in two-way trade: This structure – corresponding to
triad 16 in Figure 7 – occurs as long as:
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Trs ≤ min
(
2(a−ηb)+ cEλkTrk
2b+ c(λr+λk)E
,
2(a−ηb)+ cEλkTsk
2b+ c(λs+λk)E
)
= min
(
T˜sr, T˜rs
)
Trk ≤ min
(
2(a−ηb)+ cEλsTrs
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
,
2(a−ηb)+ cEλsTrs
2b+ c(λs+λk)E
)
= min
(
T˜kr, T˜rk
)
Tsk ≤ min
(
2(a−ηb)+ cEλrTrs
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
,
2(a−ηb)+ cEλrTrs
2b+ c(λr+λk)E
)
= min
(
T˜ks, T˜sk
)
Considering case 4.A.1, the price indexes are:
Pr =
a(2−λr)+ηλr(b+ cE)
2b+ cλrE
E
Ps =
a[2− (λr+λs)]+ [η(λr+λs)+Trsλr](b+ cE)
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
E
Pk =
a+(η+λrTrk+λsTsk)(b+ cE)
2b+ cE
E
and the equilibrium prices and quantities:
prr =
a+η(b+ cλrE)
2b+ cλrE
qrr = (b+ cE)(prr−η)
pss =
a+η [b+ c(λr+λs)E]+ Trs2 cλrE
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
qss = (b+ cE)(pss−η)
pkk =
a+η(b+ cE)+
(
Trk
2 λr+
Tsk
2 λs
)
cE
2b+ cE
prs = pss+
Trs
2
qrs = (b+ cE)(prs−η−Trs)
prk = pkk+
Trk
2
qrk = (b+ cE)(prk−η−Trk)
psr = 2prr−η qsr = 0
psk = pkk+
Tsk
2
qsk = (b+ cE)(psk−η−Tsk)
pkr = 2prr−η qkr = 0
pks = 2pss−η qks = 0
The equilibrium profits for the case 4.A.1 are:
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pir = (prr−η)2
(
L
3
+λrE
)
(b+ cE)
+ (prs−η−Trs)2
(
L
3
+λsE
)
(b+ cE)
+ (prk−η−Trk)2
(
L
3
+λkE
)
(b+ cE)
pis = (b+ cE)
[
(pss−η)2
(
L
3
+λsE
)
+(psr−η−Trs)2
(
L
3
+λrE
)]
pik = (b+ cE)(pkk−η)2
(
L
3
+λkE
)
According to this configuration, a creation of a link from s to k has a negative
effect on profits and on welfare for r (with no effect on consumer’s surplus in this
region). It has a positive effect on region s profits and on this region welfare (with
no effect on consumer’s surplus). Finally, the effect on k is ambiguous, since the
negative effect on profit is counterbalanced by the positive effect on the consumer’s
surplus.
Considering case 4.B.1, the price indexes are:
Pr =
a[2− (λr+λs)]+ [η(λr+λs)+Trsλs](b+ cE)
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
E
Ps =
a[2− (λr+λs)]+ [η(λr+λs)+Trsλr](b+ cE)
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
E
Pk =
a+(η+λrTrk+λsTsk)(b+ cE)
2b+ cE
E
and the equilibrium prices and quantities:
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prr =
a+η [b+ c(λr+λs)E]+ Trs2 cλsE
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
qrr = (b+ cE)(prr−η)
pss =
a+η [b+ c(λr+λs)E]+ Trs2 cλrE
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
qss = (b+ cE)(pss−η)
pkk =
a+η(b+ cE)+
(
Trk
2 λr+
Tsk
2 λs
)
cE
2b+ cE
qkk = (b+ cE)(pkk−η)
prs = pss+
Trs
2
qrs = (b+ cE)(prs−η−Trs)
prk = pkk+
Trk
2
qrk = (b+ cE)(prk−η−Trk)
psr = prr+
Trs
2
qsr = (b+ cE)(psr−η−Trs)
psk = pkk+
Tsk
2
qsk = (b+ cE)(psk−η−Tsk)
pkr = 2prr−η qkr = 0
pks = 2pss−η qks = 0
The equilibrium profits for the case 4.B.1 are:
pir = (prr−η)2
(
L
3
+λrE
)
(b+ cE)
+ (prs−η−Trs)2
(
L
3
+λsE
)
(b+ cE)
+ (prk−η−Trk)2
(
L
3
+λkE
)
(b+ cE)
pis = (pss−η)2
(
L
3
+λsE
)
(b+ cE)
+ (psr−η−Trs)2
(
L
3
+λrE
)
(b+ cE)
+ (psk−η−Tsk)2
(
L
3
+λkE
)
(b+ cE)
pik = (b+ cE)(pkk−η)2
(
L
3
+λkE
)
In this configuration, the creation of a link from s to r has a negative effect on
profits for firms located in region r and a positive effect on the surplus of consumers
located in that region, with an ambiguous overall effect on welfare. The effect on
welfare of region s is positive due to the increase in profits, whereas the effect on
the consumer’ surplus is nil. The creation of such a link has no short-run effect on
region k.
Considering case 4.C, the price indexes are:
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Pr =
a+(η+λsTrs+λkTrk)(b+ cE)
2b+ cE
E
Ps =
a[2− (λr+λs)]+ [η(λr+λs)+Trsλr](b+ cE)
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
E
Pk =
a+(η+λrTrk+λsTsk)(b+ cE)
2b+ cE
E
and the equilibrium prices and quantities:
prr =
a+η(b+ cE)+
(
Trs
2 λs+
Trk
2 λk
)
cE
2b+ cE
qrr = (b+ cE)(prr−η)
pss =
a+η [b+ c(λr+λs)E]+ Trs2 cλrE
2b+ c(λr+λs)E
qss = (b+ cE)(pss−η)
pkk =
a+η(b+ cE)+
(
Trk
2 λr+
Tsk
2 λs
)
cE
2b+ cE
qkk = (b+ cE)(pkk−η)
prs = pss+
Trs
2
qrs = (b+ cE)(prs−η−Trs)
prk = pkk+
Trk
2
qrk = (b+ cE)(prk−η−Trk)
psr = prr+
Trs
2
qsr = (b+ cE)(psr−η−Trs)
psk = pkk+
Tsk
2
qsk = (b+ cE)(psk−η−Tsk)
pkr = prr+
Trk
2
qkr = (b+ cE)(pkr−η−Trk)
pks = 2pss−η qks = 0
The equilibrium profits for the case 4.C are:
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pir = (prr−η)2
(
L
3
+λrE
)
(b+ cE)
+ (prs−η−Trs)2
(
L
3
+λsE
)
(b+ cE)
+ (prk−η−Trk)2
(
L
3
+λkE
)
(b+ cE)
pis = (psr−η−Trs)2
(
L
3
+λrE
)
(b+ cE)
+ (pss−η)2
(
L
3
+λsE
)
(b+ cE)
+ (psk−η−Tsk)2
(
L
3
+λkE
)
(b+ cE)
pik =
[
(pkr−η−Trk)2
(
L
3
+λrE
)
+(pkk−η)2
(
L
3
+λkE
)]
(b+ cE)
According to this configuration, compared to the case 4.B.1, the creation of a
link from k to r determines for region r a reduction in profits; however, since the
consumer’s surplus in this region is increased, the overall effect on region r welfare
is ambiguous. The effect on region s’s welfare is negative due to the impact of
stronger competition in r on the profits of s-firms accruing from the market in r.
Finally, the effect on k is positive due to the profits accruing to k-firms from the
market in r.
Considering case 4.D, the price indexes are:
Pr =
a+(η+λsTrs+λkTrk)(b+ cE)
2b+ cE
E
Ps =
a+(η+λrTrs+λkTsk)(b+ cE)
2b+ cE
E
Pk =
a+(η+λrTrk+λsTsk)(b+ cE)
2b+ cE
E
and the equilibrium prices and quantities:
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prr =
a+η(b+ cE)+
(
Trs
2 λs+
Trk
2 λk
)
cE
2b+ cE
qrr = (b+ cE)(prr−η)
pss =
a+η(b+ cE)+
(
Trs
2 λr+
Tsk
2 λk
)
cE
2b+ cE
qss = (b+ cE)(pss−η)
pkk =
a+η(b+ cE)+
(
Trk
2 λr+
Tsk
2 λs
)
cE
2b+ cE
qkk = (b+ cE)(pkk−η)
prs = pss+
Trs
2
qrs = (b+ cE)(prs−η−Trs)
prk = pkk+
Trk
2
qrk = (b+ cE)(prk−η−Trk)
psr = prr+
Trs
2
qsr = (b+ cE)(psr−η−Trs)
psk = pkk+
Tsk
2
qsk = (b+ cE)(psk−η−Tsk)
pkr = prr+
Trk
2
qkr = (b+ cE)(pkr−η−Trk)
pks = pss+
Tsk
2
qks = (b+ cE)(pks−η−Tsk)
The equilibrium profits for the case 4.D are:
pir = (prr−η)2
(
L
3
+λrE
)
(b+ cE)
+ (prs−η−Trs)2
(
L
3
+λsE
)
(b+ cE)
+ (prk−η−Trk)2
(
L
3
+λkE
)
(b+ cE)
pis = (psr−η−Trs)2
(
L
3
+λrE
)
(b+ cE)
+ (pss−η)2
(
L
3
+λsE
)
(b+ cE)
+ (psk−η−Tsk)2
(
L
3
+λkE
)
(b+ cE)
pik = (pkr−η−Trk)2
(
L
3
+λrE
)
(b+ cE)
+ (pks−η−Tsk)2
(
L
3
+λsE
)
(b+ cE)
+ (pkk−η)2
(
L
3
+λkE
)
(b+ cE)
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According to this configuration, the creation of a link from k to s has the follow-
ing short-run effect on the three regions welfare: The effect on region r’s welfare
is negative since the impact of stronger competition in s reduces the profits that are
accruing to r-firms from the market in s. The effect on s is ambiguous: indeed the
negative effect on profits is counterbalanced by the increase in the surplus of con-
sumers living in that region. Finally, the effect on k is positive given to the profits
accruing to the k-firms originating from the market in s.
4.6 From theory back to triad census - a special case as an
example.
In the previous subsection, we derived conditions on the trade costs for the occur-
rence of different triad patterns. In this subsection, we illustrate how these conditions
can be used to corroborate the empirically found regularities in the trade network as
summarized in Table 2.
One striking result of the triad census was that triad 3 (Mutual edge) and triad
8 (Mutual edge + Out) are much more often found than triad 7 (Mutual edge +
In), which means that when two regions establish a mutual trade relationship this
fosters them to export on, more than to import from, a third region. Theory suggests
that more trade links come into existence with lower trade costs. This leads to the
following interpretation: If in a triplet of regions all trade costs are very high, no
trade occurs. If in a triplet of regions, bilateral trade costs between regions r and
s are lower, than mutual trade occurs between those two regions. If in a triplet of
regions, trade costs between another pair of regions – say between r and k – are
lower as well, than unilateral trade from region r to region k is much more often
found (resulting in triad 8) than trade in the opposite direction (which would lead
to triad 7). There is an economic rationale for this difference that relies on third
country effects, i.e. on the network structure: Exporting from region r to region k is
comparatively easy, because in region k no third country competition is yet present
(there is no trade from s to k). Trade in the opposite direction - i.e. exporting from
region k to region r - is more difficult, since in region r also competing firms from
the third country, i.e. from region s, are already present.
In order to focus on these network effects, we assume as simplification a uniform
distribution of firms, i.e. λr = λs = λk = 13 . Then, the conditions for the occurrence
of triad 8 (16), (17) and (18) reduce to
Trs ≤min
(
2(a−ηb)
2b+ c 13E
,
2(a−ηb)
2b+ c 13E
)
2(a−ηb)+ cE 13Trs
2b+ c 23E
< Trk ≤ 2(a−ηb)
2b+ c 13E
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Tsk > max
(
2(a−ηb)+ cE 13Trk
2b+ c 23E
,
2(a−ηb)+ cE 13Trs
2b+ c 23E
)
The second equation can only hold if
2(a−ηb)+ cE 13Trs
2b+ c 23E
<
2(a−ηb)
2b+ c 13E
which can be easily transformed into the first condition, that is also the condition
(13) holding for triad 3, i.e. for bilateral trade. Therefore, if bilateral trade between
region r and region s exists and if Trk sufficiently falls, than exports from region r to
region k may start - triad 8 may come into existence.
Instead, Triad 7 is characterized by the conditions (19), (20) and (21), that by
setting λr = λs = λk = 13 simplify to :
Trs ≤min
(
2(a−ηb)
2b+ c 13E
,
2(a−ηb)+ cE 13Trk
2b+ c 23E
)
2(a−ηb)
2b+ c 13E
= T˜k < Trk ≤ T˜kr =
2(a−ηb)+ cE 13Trs
2b+ c 23E
Tsk > max
(
2(a−ηb)
2b+ c 13E
,
2(a−ηb)+ cE 13Trs
2b+ c 23E
)
The second equation can only hold if
2(a−ηb)
2b+ c 13E
<
2(a−ηb)+ cE 13Trs
2b+ c 23E
which can be transformed into
2(a−ηb)(
2b+ c 13E
) < Trs
which contradicts the first equation. Therefore, triad 7 is not a possible outcome
of a reduction in Trk.
Summing up, for an equal distribution of firms, we can show that a reduction in
Trk may lead to triad 8, while triad 7 is not possible. The result might change for
unequal distributions, but this analysis is left for further studies.
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5 Final Remarks
Some stylized facts emerging from the network analysis of interregional trade flows
have confirmed that the European economic integration is still largely incomplete:
most regions do not trade with any other region, but they rather select their partners,
and a relatively small number of regions play a central role in the network structure.
Moreover, the triad census analysis has revealed that the large majority of triads in
the EU regional trade is represented by empty-graph structures (autarky), followed
by single and mutual edges. This suggests that regions select their partners engaging
mostly in bilateral trade. In addition, when two regions, say r and s, establish a
mutual trade relationship, a third region, say k, is more likely to participate as an
importer rather than as an exporter.
In order to shed more light to the processes that shape the specific network struc-
ture, we used a three-region footloose entrepreneur model. This model stresses the
fact that an integrated market, for example the one composed of regions r and s, is
more difficult to access than a non-integrated market (for example that represented
by region k) due to stronger competition. Therefore, for region r or s is easier to
export towards k (with an outward link) than the other way round (for k to export
towards r or s, with an inward link). Using the model, we derived explicit conditions
on the bilateral trade cost for the occurrence of each of the 16 possible triads. For a
special case, we exemplified how these conditions can be used to draw interferences
on the network structure. Based on this evidence, it has been possible to envisage a
specific sequence of links generation. This sequence starts from the case of full au-
tarky, with no links; it proceeds to the creation of a one-directional link, for example
from r to s; next, a bidirectional link between r and s comes into existence, then a
further link towards a third region k and, finally, a second bidirectional link, for ex-
ample between r and k is created. Implicit in this sequence, there is a corresponding
reduction of trade costs, which characterizes the process of European integration.
However, this can be assessed only by looking at time series data and we leave this
to future work.
Appendix
AT11 Burgenland FI19 Lansi-Suomi PL43 Lubuskie
AT12 Niederosterreich FI1A Pohjois-Suomi PL51 Dolnoslaskie
AT13 Wien FI20 Aland PL52 Opolskie
AT21 Karnten FR10 Ile de France PL61 Kujawsko-Pomorskie
AT22 Steiermark FR21 Champagne-Ardenne PL62 Warminsko-Mazurskie
AT31 Oberosterreich FR22 Picardie PL63 Pomorskie
AT32 Salzburg FR23 Haute-Normandie PT11 Norte
AT33 Tirol FR24 Centre PT15 Algarve
AT34 Vorarlberg FR25 Basse-Normandie PT16 Centro (PT)
BE10 Region de Bruxelles FR26 Bourgogne PT17 Lisboa
BE21 Prov. Antwerpen FR30 Nord - Pas-de-Calais PT18 Alentejo
BE22 Prov. Limburg (B) FR41 Lorraine PT20 Regio Autnoma dos Aores
BE23 Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen FR42 Alsace PT30 Regio Autnoma da Madeira
44 Basile, Commendatore, De Benedictis, Kubin
BE24 Prov. Vlaams Brabant FR43 Franche-Comte SE11 Stockholm
BE25 Prov. West-Vlaanderen FR51 Pays de la Loire SE12 ostra Mellansverige
BE31 Prov. Brabant Wallon FR52 Bretagne SE21 Sydsverige
BE32 Prov. Hainaut FR53 Poitou-Charentes SE22 Norra Mellansverige
BE33 Prov. Liege FR61 Aquitaine SE23 Mellersta Norrland
BE34 Prov. Luxembourg (B) FR62 Midi-Pyrenees SE31 ovre Norrland
BE35 Prov. Namur FR63 Limousin SE32 Smland med oarna
CZ01 Praha FR71 Rhone-Alpes SE33 Vstsverige
CZ02 Stredni Cechy FR72 Auvergne SK01 Bratislavsk kraj
CZ03 Jihozapad FR81 Languedoc-Roussillon SK02 Zapadne Slovensko
CZ04 Severozapad FR82 Provence-Alpes-Cote d Azur SK03 Stredne Slovensko
CZ05 Severovychod FR83 Corse SK04 Vchodne Slovensko
CZ06 Jihovychod GR11 Anatoliki Makedonia Thraki UKC1 Tees Valley and Durham
CZ07 Stredni Morava GR12 Kentriki Makedonia UKC2 Northumberland Tyne and Wear
CZ08 Moravskoslezko GR13 Dytiki Makedonia UKD1 Cumbria
DE11 Stuttgart GR14 Thessalia UKD2 Cheshire
DE12 Karlsruhe GR21 Ipeiros UKD3 Greater Manchester
DE13 Freiburg GR22 Ionia Nisia UKD4 Lancashire
DE14 Tubingen GR23 Dytiki Ellada UKD5 Merseyside
DE21 Oberbayern GR24 Sterea Ellada UKE1 East Riding, North Lincolnshire
DE22 Niederbayern GR25 Peloponnisos UKE2 North Yorkshire
DE23 Oberpfalz GR30 Attiki UKE3 South Yorkshire
DE24 Oberfranken GR41 Voreio Aigaio UKE4 West Yorkshire
DE25 Mittelfranken GR42 Notio Aigaio UKF1 Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire
DE26 Unterfranken GR43 Kriti UKF2 Leicestershire Rutland
DE27 Schwaben HU10 Kozep-Magyarorszag UKF3 Lincolnshire
DE30 Berlin HU21 Kozep-Dunantul UKG1 Herefordshire Worcestershire
DE41 Brandenburg - Nordost HU22 Nyugat-Dunantul UKG2 Shropshire and Staffordshire
DE42 Brandenburg - Sdwest HU23 Del-Dunantul UKG3 West Midlands
DE50 Bremen HU31 eszak-Magyarorszag UKH1 East Anglia
DE60 Hamburg HU32 eszak-Alfold UKH2 Bedfordshire Hertfordshire
DE71 Darmstadt HU33 Del-Alfold UKH3 Essex
DE72 Giessen IE01 Border Midlands UKI1 Inner London
DE73 Kassel IE02 Southern and Eastern UKI2 Outer London
DE80 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern ITC1 Piemonte UKJ1 Berkshire Bucks Oxfordshire
DE91 Braunschweig ITC2 Valle dAosta Vallee dAoste UKJ2 Surrey East and West Sussex
DE92 Hannover ITC3 Liguria UKJ3 Hampshire and Isle of Wight
DE93 Luneburg ITC4 Lombardia UKJ4 Kent
DE94 Weser-Ems ITD1 Bolzano-Bozen UKK1 Gloucestershire Wiltshire
DEA1 Dusseldorf ITD2 Provincia Autonoma Trento UKK2 Dorset and Somerset
DEA2 Koln ITD3 Veneto UKK3 Cornwall and Isles of Scilly
DEA3 Munster ITD4 Friuli-Venezia Giulia UKK4 Devon
DEA4 Detmold ITD5 Emilia-Romagna UKL1 West Wales and The Valleys
DEA5 Arnsberg ITE1 Toscana UKL2 East Wales
DEB1 Koblenz ITE2 Umbria UKM2 North Eastern Scotland
DEB2 Trier ITE3 Marche UKM3 Eastern Scotland
DEB3 Rheinhessen-Pfalz ITE4 Lazio UKM5 South Western Scotland
DEC0 Saarland ITF1 Abruzzo UKM6 Highlands and Islands
DED1 Chemnitz ITF2 Molise UKN0 Northern Ireland
DED2 Dresden ITF3 Campania BG31 Severozapaden
DED3 Leipzig ITF4 Puglia BG32 Severen tsentralen
DEE0 Sachsen-Anhalt ITF5 Basilicata BG33 Severoiztochen
DEF0 Schleswig-Holstein ITF6 Calabria BG34 Yugoiztochen
DEG0 Thringen ITG1 Sicilia BG41 Yugozapaden
DK01 Hovedstadsreg ITG2 Sardegna BG42 Yuzhen tsentralen
DK02 Ost for Storeblt LT00 Lietuva CY00 Kypros/K?br?s
DK03 Syddanmark LU00 Luxembourg (Grand-D) SI01 Vzhodna Slovenija
DK04 Midtjylland LV00 Latvija SI02 Zahodna Slovenija
DK05 Nordjylland MT00 Malta RO11 Nord-Vest
EE00 Eesti NL11 Groningen RO12 Centru
ES11 Galicia NL12 Friesland RO21 Nord-Est
ES12 Principado de Asturias NL13 Drenthe RO22 Sud-Est
ES13 Cantabria NL21 Overijssel RO31 Sud Muntenia
ES21 Pais Vasco NL22 Gelderland RO32 Bucure?ti Ilfov
ES22 Foral de Navarra NL23 Flevoland RO41 Sud-Vest Oltenia
ES23 La Rioja NL31 Utrecht RO42 Vest
ES24 Aragon NL32 Noord-Holland
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ES30 Comunidad de Madrid NL33 Zuid-Holland
ES41 Castilla y Leon NL34 Zeeland
ES42 Castilla-la Mancha NL41 Noord-Brabant
ES43 Extremadura NL42 Limburg (NL)
ES51 Cataluna PL11 Ldzkie
ES52 Comunidad Valenciana PL12 Mazowieckie
ES53 Illes Balears PL21 Malopolskie
ES61 Andalucia PL22 Slaskie
ES62 Region de Murcia PL31 Lubelskie
ES63 Ceuta (ES) PL32 Podkarpackie
ES64 Melilla (ES) PL33 Swietokrzyskie
ES70 Canarias (ES) PL34 Podlaskie
FI13 Ita-Suomi PL41 Wielkopolskie
FI18 Etela-Suomi PL42 Zachodniopomorskie
Table 3: Regional NUTS-2 classification
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